Lattice-Based Cryptography
Structural analysis of lattice problems underlying schemes such as ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and how their security assumptions translate into practical parameter choices.
Independent Research Project
Studying how cryptographic systems can withstand attacks from large-scale quantum computers — from lattice-based mathematics to the real-world migration of protocols and infrastructure.
Quantum computers capable of running Shor's algorithm at scale would break the public-key cryptography that currently secures most digital communication, including RSA and elliptic-curve systems. Post-quantum cryptography (PQC) develops new mathematical foundations — primarily lattice-based, hash-based, and code-based constructions — that remain hard to break even for a quantum adversary, while still running efficiently on classical hardware.
This project follows that transition: how the newly standardized algorithms work, how they hold up once implemented in real software and hardware, and what migrating existing systems to PQC actually requires in practice.
Structural analysis of lattice problems underlying schemes such as ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204), and how their security assumptions translate into practical parameter choices.
Side-channel and fault-attack resistance of PQC implementations — where timing, power, and memory-access patterns can leak information that the underlying math promises to hide.
How TLS, SSH, and other deployed protocols adopt hybrid and post-quantum key exchange, and what that transition costs in compatibility, key size, and handshake performance.
Measuring computational and bandwidth overhead of PQC algorithms against classical baselines, across constrained and general-purpose environments.
No updates published yet. Findings, notes, and publications will appear here as the work progresses.